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Clerk of the Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Re

J. Richard Rees, M.D. v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc. dba McKay-Dee Hospital;
Case No. 890170 (Category No. 14b)

Greetings:
I have prepared this letter pursuant to Rule 24(j) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedu re to advise the Court of a
significant authority which came to my attention in the course
of preparing oral argument in the a bove-referenced appeal.
This authority, the Utah Supreme Co urt opinion in Piacitelli v.
Southern Utah State College, 636 P. 2d 1063 (Utah 1981), relates
to the appellant's argument made at pages 28-30 of Appellant's
Brief that Dr. Rees was entitled to an award of, at most,
nominal damages based on the author ity of Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247 (1978). Piacitelli holds that an employee who is
dismissed with cause but in violati on of an employment contract
is entitled to recover back pay for the period between his
defective dismissal and the date of his dismissal accomplished
through procedurally appropriate me ans.
Sincerely,
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

Ronald
RENrcf
cc: Justices of the Supreme Court
Charles W. Dahlquist, Esq.
5202D
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James E. PIACITELLI, Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Respondent,
SOUTHERN UTAH STATE COLLEGE;
and Orville D. Carnahan, President,
Southern Utah State College, Defendants, Respondents, and Cross-Appellants.
No. 17202.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 18, 1981.
Terminated college coordinator of
counselling brought action against college
and its president seeking reinstatement and
damages for college's alleged violation of
contractually guaranteed termination procedures. The Fifth District Court, Iron
County, Robert F. Owens, J., denied reinstatement but awarded back pay, and plaintiff appealed and college cross appealed.
The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that:
(1) there was substantial evidence to support trial court's finding that substantial
purpose of the guaranteed termination procedures were fulfilled, and thus plaintiff
was not entitled to reinstatement, and (2)
plaintiff was entitled as a matter of contract law to back pay for period between
his procedurally defective dismissal and
subsequent proper dismissal.
Affirmed.

trial court's findings of fact, and those findings are entitled to presumption of correctness and may not be overturned so long as
they are supported by substantial evidence
in record.
4. Colleges and Universities o=»8.1(6)
In action brought by terminated college coordinator of counselling against college alleging that his termination was not
in compliance with procedures promulgated
in college's personnel manual, evidence supported trial court's finding that substantial
purpose of requirement of progressive discipline had been fulfilled by the college, and
thus coordinator was not entitled to reinstatement.
5. Colleges and Universities <s=>8.1(7)
College coordinator of counselling who
was dismissed with sufficient cause, but in
violation of contractually guaranteed termination procedures, was entitled as matter of
contract law to back pay for period between
his procedurally defective dismissal and
subsequent proper dismissal.
6. Colleges and Universities <3=>8.1(7)
The tort measure of damages under
Federal Civil Rights Statute providing for
civil action for deprivation of rights was
inapplicable to claim of terminated college
coordinator of counselling against state college for reinstatement and for damages
which was based solely on breach of employment contract. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

1. Colleges and Universities <s=»8.1(l)
An educational institution may undertake a contractual obligation to observe
particular termination formalities by adopting procedures or by promulgating rules
and regulations governing the employment
relationship.
2. Colleges and Universities e=>8.1(4)
So long as the substantial interests a
college's termination procedures are designed to safeguard are in fact satisfied and
protected, college's failure to conform to
every technical detail of the procedures is
not actionable.

7. Colleges and Universities <s=> 8.1(7)
Proper measure of damages for a college employee who has been dismissed without substantial compliance with agreed termination procedures is proposed salary for
the appropriate period, less amounts actually earned by employee during that period or
amount he reasonably could have earned in
other available employment of a like nature, and employee is also entitled to statutory interest; where no salary agreement
has been reached for damage period, rate of
pay for previous salary year should be used
as base salary amount.

3. Appeal and Error <s=>931(l), 1010.1(6)
On appeal, Supreme Court must consider all evidence in light most favorable to

8. Colleges and Universities c=>8.1(7)
Mitigation of damages for a college
employee who has been dismissed without

substantial compliance with agreed termi- to be interpreted as 'dismissal for cause,'
nation procedures is an affirmative defense, which action, if taken, would result in imand any amounts in mitigation may be es- mediate termination of employment . . . "
The Dean of Students later explained in an
tablished by employer.
affidavit that the administration preferred
nonrenewal to dismissal for cause "out of
H. Delbert Welker, Salt Lake City, for consideration for his professional future
appellant.
and in accordance with higher education
Robert L. Gardner, Cedar City, for re- practices . . . "
spondent.
I. THE INITIAL PROCEEDING
OAKS, Justice:
Piacitelli commenced his initial action on
This is an action by a college employee April 17, 1979, charging that a failure to
who claims he was terminated without the renew his employment contract was, in efformal termination procedures required by fect, a dismissal for cause and as such viohis contract. The district court denied rein- lated his "due process rights as set forth in
statement but awarded back pay for a peri- the SUSC Personnel Policies and Proceod of approximately six months. The em- dures." Piacitelli asked for declaratory reployee appeals the failure to reinstate him, lief, reinstatement, costs and attorney's
and the College cross-appeals the award of fees, and "such other and further relief as
back pay. We affirm on both issues.
the court deems proper."
In 1973, plaintiff Piacitelli commenced
In the district court, Piacitelli relied on
employment as Coordinator of Counseling the College's Personnel Policies and Proceat Southern Utah State College (SUSC) dures Manual (hereinafter "Personnel Man(hereinafter "the College"). In this posi- ual"), Section 11-14 of which sets forth fortion, which was categorized as nonfacuity mal procedures to be followed in the "dis"classified staff," he was not eligible for missal" of a classified employee who has
tenure like faculty members at the College. completed a six-month probationary period.
In each of the academic years beginning Several passages in the Personnel Manual
1973 through 1978, Piacitelli was issued a seem to suggest that all employees are ei"Notice of Appointment," signed by the ther probationary (terminable at will) or
President of the College and effective "for permanent (terminable only after complithe contract period" of July 1 through June ance with specified procedures). Conse30. This document specified Piacitelli's job quently, Piacitelli argued, by not renewing
title, department, and salary for the year. a "permanent" employee's contract the ColFor each of those years, Piacitelli signed lege was attempting to circumvent its own
and returned a form indicating his accept- procedures and accomplish indirectly what
ance of employment for the duration and its Personnel Manual prevented it from accompensation specified.
complishing directly.
Beginning early in his employment, a
The College conceded that Piacitelli was a
number of conflicts and disagreements classified employee and that he was not
arose between Piacitelli and his supervisors, probationary. However, it contended that
the Dean and Associate Dean of Students. Piacitelli was employed on a year-to-year
Some of these problems were resolved; oth- basis; that his contract expired by its own
ers were not. In December, 1978, Piacitel- terms in June, 1979; and that he was not
li's immediate supervisor recommended that dismissed at all, but simply not rehired.
the College not continue to employ Piacitelli Therefore, the College concluded, its formal
as a counselor. In a one-sentence letter termination procedures did not apply.
dated January 24, 1979, the College Presi- Those procedures would have applied, acdent informed Piacitelli that his contract cording to the College, only if Piacitelli had
would "not be renewed at the end of the been dismissed before the expiration of the
current contract period." In a letter dated annual contract period. The College furFebruary 13, 1979, the President advised ther argued that to equate nonrenewal with
Piacitelli that the College's action was "not dismissal would, in effect, grant tenure sta-

the fact that this status is not conferred on
all of the faculty.1
In January, 1980, the district court ruled
that the College's Personnel Manual governed the terms of Piacitelli's employment
contract with the College, that Piacitelli
had acquired "permanent employment status" under that contract, and that the College's failure to renew Piacitelli's annual
employment contract without complying
"with due process of law requirements pursuant to [the Personnel Manual] . . . constituted plaintiff's termination and thus a
breach of contract." The district court
thereupon ordered the College to grant Piacitelli "administrative due process procedure pursuant to the [Personnel Manual]."
This was a final order, which, unless reversed on appeal, is res judicata and binding upon these parties. Bradshaw v. Kershaw, Utah, 627 P.2d 528 (1981); Federated
Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,
U.S.
, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981).
The order was not appealed. Consequently,
for purposes of this case, we must treat
Piacitelli as an employee with permanent
employment status whose employment contract entitled him to the formal procedures
specified in the Personnel Manual before he
could be dismissed or terminated, even at
the conclusion of the annual contract period.2
II.

THE DISMISSAL AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDING
On February 8, 1980, the College Personnel Director issued a formal notice of dis1. For the reasons stated hereafter, this question
is not before us in this case and we express no
opinion on it.
2. We intimate no agreement or disagreement
with the district court's construction of Piacitelli's employment status or with its conclusion
on the rights of classified College employees
receiving annual notices of appointment. The
fact that the question is res judicata settles
those questions for these litigants and this case
only.
3. The first appeal was to the Employee Dismissal Review Committee, a group consisting
of six College employees, which held a one and
one-half day hearing at which Piacitelli was
represented by a representative of the Utah

ngni u> appeal, nacitelli pursued his appeal through three college appellate authorities, 3 all of which upheld the dismissal.
Piacitelli then took the controversy back
to the district court, which on June 2, 1980,
issued an order to show cause why the
College should not be held in contempt of
court or reinstate Piacitelli to his former
position and pay him back wages. After a
hearing on this order, the district court
ruled that the College had substantially
complied with its procedures, that Piacitelli
was rightfully terminated as of February 8,
1980, that there were no grounds for ordering the College to reinstate him, and that
he was entitled to back pay for the period
July 1, 1979, through February 8, 1980.

III. REINSTATEMENT FOR
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH
PERSONNEL MANUAL
Piacitelli's sole argument on appeal is
that the district court should have ordered
him reinstated because, contrary to the
court's conclusion, the College had not adequately complied with the contractual termination procedures contained in its Personnel Manual.4 This argument is based
entirely on sections of the Personnel Manual that provide for "progressive discipline,"
the imposition of increasingly severe sanctions before dismissal. Section 11-14 of the
Manual outlines four steps of progressive
discipline: (1) oral warning, (2) written
Public Employees Association. The Committee
recommended to the College's President that
the dismissal be sustained. Piacitelli appealed
this decision to the President, who sustained
the Committee's decision. Piacitelli then appealed to the Institutional Council, which undertook a full-dress review of the hearing. The
Institutional Council, with nine of ten members
present, unanimously upheld the President's
decision and the recommendation of the Dismissal Review Committee.
4. See generally, Duerr, "Annotation: Reinstatement as a Remedy in Cases Involving Termination of Tenured Faculty," 7 J. of Coll. & U.L. 57
(1981).

warning, (3) suspension, and (4) dismissal.
We need not decide whether the College
was obligated to follow the progressive discipline requirements of the Personnel Manual on the facts of this case because we
agree with the district court's finding that
the College's actions constituted substantial
compliance with those requirements in any
event.
[1] We underline at the outset the district court's finding, which is now binding
in this case, that the terms of Piacitelii's
employment were governed by the College's
Personnel Manual. This finding comports
with the numerous holdings that an educational institution may undertake a contractual obligation to observe particular termination formalities by adopting procedures
or by promulgating rules and regulations
governing the employment relationship.
Greene v. Howard University, 412 F.2d 1128
(D.C.Cir.1969); Decker v. Worcester Junior
College, 369 Mass. 960, 336 N.E.2d 909
(1975); Hillis v. Meister, 82 N.M. 474, 483
P.2d 1314 (1971); Zimmerman v. Minot
State College, N.D., 198 N.W.2d 108 (1972).5
We are, therefore, construing a contract,
not declaring statutory or constitutional
rights.

rather than punitive," should concentrate
on "preventing serious personnel problems
from occurring," and "should never involve
the element of surprise to the employee."
Id. at pp. 2 and 5. The Manual also states
that "[t]he 'progressive discipline' process
used in appropriate circumstances is a follow-through method to ensure that infractions, misconduct, or unacceptable performance is treated in a manner that will eliminate, correct, or resolve such actions or
practices, if possible." Id. at p. 5. It is
clear from these statements that the purpose of the progressive discipline approach
is to prevent major acts of misconduct by
giving the employee an early warning of
the possible consequences of his persisting
in unacceptable behavior.

The College's Personnel Manual states
that "generally there is a required corrective action," which the manual refers to as
"progressive discipline," which "may result
in dismissal or suspension unless there is a
major, serious, or aggravated act of misconduct which requires immediate action."
Personnel Manual, 11-14, p. 2. The Manual
also provides that progressive discipline
should be "corrective whenever possible,

[2] Circuit Judge Owens, sitting by designation after the initial proceeding in the
district court, ruled that substantial compliance with the procedural requirements of
the Personnel Manual was sufficient so long
as it answered the purpose of those requirements:
If the purpose [of progressive discipline]
was attained through other means than
by strict adherence to the letter of the
manual, then this should not be deemed a
breach of the contract.
We agree. Because the purpose of the procedural requirements was fulfilled and the
substantial interests of the parties were
satisfied, we see no merit in requiring strict
or literal compliance with the prescribed
procedures in this case. This employment
contract between a college and a counselor
formalized a relationship of mutual trust

5. The existence of such a contractual obligation
does not preclude an employer's changing current procedures and regulations according to
existing practices and procedures for amendment. Thus, it has been held that an employer's policy manual may give nse to employee
contractual rights even where it "can be unilaterally amended by the employer without notice
to the employee
" Toussaint v. Blue Cross
and Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 615, 292
N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980) (non-educational employer). See also, Knowles v. Unity College,
Me., 429 A^d 220 (1981).
In the absence of a contractually based obligation for continued employment or mandatory

termination procedures, many courts have held
that an educational institution may, with proper notice, choose not to renew a nontenured
employee's contract for no reason or for any
reason other than a few constitutionally impermissible ones. Hickmgbottom v. Easley, 494
F.Supp. 980 (ED.Ark.1980); Cooper v. Ross,
472 F.Supp. 802 (E.D.Ark.1979), Kota v. Uttle,
351 F.Supp. 1059 (E.D.N.C1971), afTd 473 F.2d
1 (1973); Nance v. Oregon State System of
Higher Ed., 23 Or.App. 558, 543 P.2d 687
(1975), cert, denied 429 U.S. 827, 97 S.Ct. 84, 50
L.Ed.2d 90 (1876). See also, Bd. of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d
548 (1972).

sides should be measured by the substance
of the relationship, not by its technical details While exact conformance with the
precise terms of the termination procedures
is doubtless the least controversial course,
so long as the substantial interests those
procedures are designed to safeguard are in
fact satisfied and protected, failure to conform to every technical detail of the termination procedure is not actionable Carr v
Board of Trustees, 465 F Supp 886 (N D
Ohio 1979) (alternative ground)
Was the substantial purpose of the requirement of progressive discipline fulfilled
in the circumstances of this case7 The district court found as follows
A review of affidavits on both sides discloses quite clearly that (1) Plaintiff was
advised, directly or by inference, of his
unacceptable conduct repeatedly over a
period of years, and (2) that he resisted
conforming This Court further finds
that this history substantially fulfilled
the corrective purposes of the Personnel
Manual, and was the effective equivalent
of the oral warning-written warning-suspension-dismissal procedure set forth in
Section D of the Manual
[3,4] On appeal, this Court must consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings of fact
Those findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness and may not be overturned so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence in the record R C
Tolman Construction Co v Myton Water
Ass'n, Utah, 563 P2d 780 (1977), Child v
Hayward, 16 Utah 2d 351, 400 P 2d 758
(1965), Charlton v Hackett, 11 Utah 2d
389, 360 P 2d 176 (1961) After reviewing
the affidavits and the other material in the
6

The first question is settled by the principle of
res judicata discussed earlier The second
question is settled by the fact that Piacitelh's
dismissal on February 8 1980, which this Court
has now sustained was based entirely on conduct he had engaged in pnor to receiving notice
of nonrenewal Thus if Piacitelh had been
accorded full termination procedures in Janu-

standmg In his numerous interviews with
his superiors, he was given ample notice
that his job was in jeopardy because of
specified deficiencies in his performance
WTe therefore sustain the district court's
conclusion that the College substantially
complied with the contract requirement of
progressive discipline
Piacitelh made no other challenge to the
district court's conclusion that he was rightfully terminated as of February 8, 1980
The judgment denying him reinstatement is
therefore affirmed
IV LIABILITY FOR BACK PAY
The College cross-appeals the district
court's ruling that Piacitelh should receive
back pa> for the period from June 30, 1979,
when the College ceased to pay him,
through Februan 8, 1980, when he was
properly terminated
[5] For purposes of this cross-appeal, we
must consider two questions settled First,
the nonrenewal of Piacitelh's contract on
June 30, 1979, was procedurally defective
because it was accomplished in violation of
his contractual right to formal termination
procedures Second, the College had just
cause to dismiss Piacitelh6 Consequently,
the back pay issue may be framed as follows Is a college employee who was dismissed with sufficient cause, but in violation of contractually guaranteed termination procedures, entitled as a matter of
contract law to back pay for the period
between the procedurally defective dismissal and the subsequent proper dismissal77
We hold in the affirmative, and affirm the
district court on the cross-appeal
ary, 1979 he could and probably would have
been terminated at that time
7. This is not a case where the terms of the
contract could be satisfied by a hearing after
the dismissal Compare the contract construed
in Lilhe \ Commerce Citv Kindergarten, Inc,
29 Colo App 553, 487 P 2d 605 (1971)
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[6] Numerous state and federal courts
have considered the propriety of back pay
awards after justified but procedurally deficient dismissals. But, unlike the instant
case, the appellate opinions in the decided
cases have not rested primarily on contract
theory. In all but one of those cases,8 the
employees' claims have been founded upon
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a federal
damage remedy against one wTho, under color of state law, deprives the plaintiff "of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . ."
The right claimed in those cases is the
Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of property without due process of
law. The property at stake in each case is
the plaintiff's contractual expectation of
continued employment. In the § 1983
cases, the employment contract ordinarily
appears only as a spoke in a larger constitutional and statutory wheel.
Back pay has normally been denied in
these constitutionally based § 1983 cases on
the rationale that the wrong suffered by
the employee was not the dismissal. (Good
cause being present, the employee would
have been dismissed even if the required
procedures had been followed.) The wrong
was the deprivation of due process. Consequently, the plaintiff is not allowed to recover back pay, which is the normal remedy
to compensate an employee dismissed without cause, but can recover only those damages directly traceable to the employer's
failure to observe due process, viz., nominal
damages and, in most cases, provable damages for mental and emotional distress.
Taliaferro v. Willett, 588 F.2d 428 (4th Cir.

1978); Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613 (4th Cir.
1978); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College
District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir.
1975), cert, denied 425 U.S. 963, 96 S.Ct.
1748, 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976); Parks v. Goff,
483 F.Supp. 502 (E.D.Ark. 1980); Ohland v.
City of Montpelier, 467 F.Supp. 324 (D.Vt.
1979).
The United States Supreme Court approved and applied this same measure of
damages to the closely analogous case of
the § 1983 damage claims of public school
students suspended without the required
due process procedures. Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252
(1978). In doing so, the Court specifically
rejected the reasoning of federal cases that
had granted back pay to employees dismissed for cause but without due process.9
Its opinion gave an extended explanation of
the rationale of damages under § 1983.
The Court characterized this statutory
cause of action as a "species of tort liability." Id. at 253, 98 S.Ct. at 1047, quoting
Imbler v. Pachtman, A2A U.S. 409, 417, 96
S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Since tort
damages are designed to compensate the
plaintiff for an injury caused by the defendant, the Court approved the principle
that "the basic purpose of a § 1983 damages
award should be to compensate persons for
injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights " Id. at 254, 98 S.Ct. at
1047. This principle excluded "presumed
damages" or damages for injuries caused by
justified suspensions. Plaintiffs were limits
ed to damages proved to have been caused
by the denial of procedural due process.10

8. See Nzomo v. Vermont State Colleges, 138 (5th Cir. 1973); Morton v. Orange County Bd.
Vt. 73, 411 A.2d 1366 (1980), a contract case
which relies on the § 1983 precedents.
9. In cases the Supreme Court cited and disapproved, 435 U.S. at 260, n. 15, 98 S.Ct. at 1050,
n. 15, Courts of Appeal in the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits had granted back pay in § 1983 actions, reasoning that a termination without the
legally required procedures was a nullity and
consequently that the employee continued to
be entitled to the benefits of the employment
relation until he was dismissed with the proper
formality. Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916 (4th
Cir. 1975); Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176

of Ed, 464 F.2d 536 (4th Cir. 1972).
10. Other courts have applied this rationale in
decisions based directly on the U. S. Constitution. These courts analogized to Carey or
some other § 1983 case. Kendall v. Bd. of Ed.%
627 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1980); Unified School Dist.
No. 480 v. Epperson, 551 F.2d 254 (10th Cir.
1977); Bowler v. Bd. of Trustees, 101 Idaho
537, 617 P.2d 841 (1980). But see Wertz v. So.
Cloud Unified School Dist. No. 344, 218 Kan.
25, 542 P.2d 339 (1975), in which a contrary
result was reached in a pre-Carey constitutional case.
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The § 1983 authorities are not persuasive
on the measure of damages that should be
applied to a claim like Piacitelli's, which is
based solely on a breach of the employment
contract.
In the tort context, neither party has any
underlying, continuing obligation to pay
money to the other. Rather, the law seeks
to compensate one party for an injury
caused by a specific tortious act. The right
to that compensation depends on a causal
chain connecting defendant's wrongful act
with plaintiff's injury. This approach dictates that an employee discharged with sufficient cause but in violation of his procedural due process rights is only entitled to
the damages he can prove were caused by
defendant's wrong.
Since defendant's
wrongful act was not the dismissal per se
but the failure to observe due process, only
damages flowing directly from the failure
to observe the required procedures are
recoverable.
This outcome contrasts with the outcome
produced by analyzing the same problem
from the standpoint of breach of contract.
By entering into an employment contract of
the type before us, the parties assume continuing obligations to one another: the employee to render services, the employer to
pay salary. Those obligations continue until they are extinguished. Here, the termination mechanism described in the Personnel Manual, which the district court found
to govern the terms of the contract between the College and its employee, was the
sole means by which the College could extinguish the contractual relationship. Until
it at least substantially complied with those
procedures, its contractual obligation continued in force and the clock continued to
run on Piacitelli's right to receive his contract salary.11 Piacitelli is therefore entitled to recover that accrued salary, and is
not limited to reimbursement for an injury
caused by a specific wrongful act.
11 An employee's right to compensation is of
course subject to termination for failure to render his own agreed performance. That sort of
failure is not at issue here since Piacitelli's
performance was excused by the College's prevention. See Fischer v. Johnson, Utah, 525
P.2d 45 (1974).
636P2d—24

This result comports with what we deem
to be sound policy for contractual employeremployee relations. It will encourage employers to comply promptly with their contractual termination procedures, and if they
fail to do so will impose the monetary consequences on the party at fault. If the rule
were otherwise, the employer could discharge an employee summarily and then
omit or delay the contractual termination
procedures with impunity so long as it was
in possession of evidence which, when ultimately provided, would justify the discharge. In that circumstance, the employee, without notice of the reason for his
dismissal and without any opportunity to
refute the charges, would remain in an indefinite and painful state of limbo, uncertain about his ultimate right to reinstatement or back pay. If our rule works any
hardship on employers, they can avoid it by
prompt and substantial compliance with the
procedures to which they have agreed.
[7,8] The proper measure of damages
for an employee who has been dismissed
without substantial compliance with agreed
termination procedures is the promised salary for the appropriate period, less amounts
actually earned by the employee during
that period or amounts he reasonably could
have earned in other available employment
of a like nature. Pratt v. Board of Education, Utah, 564 P.2d 294, 298 (1977); Williston on Contracts, Vol. 11, §§ 1358-1360 (3d
ed. 1968); Annot., "Elements and Measure
of Damages in Action by Schoolteacher for
Wrongful Discharge/' 22 A.L.R.3d 1047
(1968).12 The employee is also entitled to
interest at the statutory rate as specified in
U.C.A., 1953, § 15-1-1. PapadopouJos v.
Oregon State Board of Higher Education,
48 Or.App. 739, 617 P.2d 931 (1980). Mitigation of damages is an affirmative de12. It has also been held that the court may
reduce a back pay award where the plaintiff
teacher, after diligent search for other employment, pursued a doctoral degree at a university. Boatright v. Bd. of Trustees, 225 Kan. 327,
590 P.2d 1032 (1979).

fease, and any amounts in mitigation must
be established by the employer. Pratt v.
Board of Education, supra. Where no salary agreement has been reached for the
damage period, the rate of pay for the
previous salary year should be used as the
base salary amount. Brady v. Board of
Trustees, 196 Neb. 226, 242 N.W.2d 616
(1976).
In sum, we hold that, where the College
breached its contract with this employee by
originally discharging him without observing the formal termination procedures in
the College Personnel Manual, (1) even
though the College had good cause to dismiss the employee, it was under a contractual obligation to continue to pay his salary
until he was properly dismissed; and (2) the
College finally performed a proper dismissal
by substantially complying with the procedures in its Personnel Manual and therefore
is not obliged to reinstate the employee.
The judgment is affirmed.
awarded.

No costs

HALL, C. J., and STEWART and HOWE,
JJ., concur.
MAUGHAN, J., heard the arguments,
but died before the opinion was filed.
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LINDON CITY, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v
ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTION CO., a
corporation, Defendant and
Respondent.
No, 17141
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 21, 1981.
City brought action against contractor
for declaratory judgment as to rights and

obligations of litigants. The Fourth District Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif,
J., dismissed, and city appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C. J., held that: (1)
under provisions of contract, city was required to arbitrate prior to litigating disputes; (2) questions as to the interest rate
on delinquent payments and whether there
had been final payment by check which did
not include disputed interest were arbitrable; (3) Arbitration Act did not violate public policy; (4) Act does not deprive the city
of due process or its remedy by due course
of law; and (5) Act as applied to city was
not an unconstitutional delegation of a municipal function to a special commission.
Affirmed.
1. Arbitration <s=>7.5
Question of whether final payment had
been made under contract when the amount
paid did not include disputed interest and
question as to the rate of interest on delinquent contract payments were "disputes"
subject to arbitration under provision of
contract providing that all claims, disputes
and other matters in question arising out of
or relating to the contract documents or
breach thereof should be arbitrated, except
claims which had been waived by the making and acceptance of final payment.
2. Arbitration <s=>9
Under contract calling for arbitration
of all disputes, city was required to seek
arbitration before bringing suit under the
Arbitration Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act. U.C.A.1953, 78-31-1 et seq., 7fr33-1 et seq.
3 Arbitration <s=>7.1
Doubts as to whether the content of a
contract is arbitrable should be resolved in
favor of the parties' freedom to contract.
4. Declaratory Judgment <&»24
Purpose of the Declaratory Judgment
Act is to permit examination of legal documents and statutes to determine questions
if construction or validity arising under
such instruments, U C.A.1953, 78-33-1 et
seq.

